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MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: BID RIGGING BY PRIVATE 
EQUITY FIRMS IN MULTIBILLION DOLLAR LBOS 
Christopher M. Burke,* Stephanie A. Hackett,** David W. Mitchell,*** 
Simon J. Wilke,**** Melanie Stallings Williams,***** Michael A. 
Williams,****** and Wei Zhao******* 
In the first successful case of its kind, a class action alleging 
widespread collusion in the market for leveraged buyouts, some of the 
world’s largest private equity firms settled Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, 
LLC for $590.5 million. The case was unique not only for its size and the 
fact that it involved complex financial transactions instead of a typical 
commodity, but also because the claimants used auction theory to 
demonstrate both the “plus” factors required to prove antitrust injury and 
the resulting damages. Economic analyses show that the cost to 
shareholders of collusion in the eight litigated multi-billion dollar 
leveraged buyout transactions approached $12 billion.  
The use of empirical economic analysis in antitrust litigation is now de 
rigueur. Courts expect it, and litigants have an array of econometricians 
available who understand both how to work with data and antitrust 
doctrine. In “ordinary” commodities price fixing cases, plaintiffs and 
defendants are expected to engage experts who gather transaction data 
and apply regression theory and other economic analyses to contest 
whether it is possible to demonstrate injury, impact, and damages. Dahl 
was not an ordinary case in that it involved neither a commodity nor a 
sellers’ cartel. Instead, it involved a buyers’ cartel which, Plaintiffs 
alleged, conspired to drive down the price of a number of unique, large 
LBOs during the mid-2000s. Additionally, the case was notable because 
of the Plaintiffs’ decision to use the auction theory to demonstrate the 
existence of antitrust violations and the extent of damages  
 
*Partner, Scott & Scott (New York & San Diego). M.A., Ph.D., J.D., University of Wisconsin; 
M.A., William & Mary; B.A., Ohio State University. 
**Associate, Scott & Scott (San Diego). B.S., J.D. University of Iowa. 
***Partner, Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd LLP (San Diego). J.D., University of San 
Diego School of Law; B.A. University of Richmond. 
  ****Professor, Economics, University of Southern California. M.A. and Ph.D. (Economics) 
University of Rochester, B.Comm. (Economics) University of New South Wales.   
  ***** Professor & Chair, Department of Business Law, California State University, 
Northridge. J.D., Boston University; B.A., University of California. The author thanks William Mumford 
Havens for comments and Professor William E. Ryckman, Jr. for teaching her how to think. 
******Director, Competition Economics, LLC. M.A. and Ph.D. (Economics) University of 
Chicago; B.A. (Economics) University of California, Santa Barbara. 
*******Principal, Competition Economics, LLC. Ph.D. (Economics) Johns Hopkins 
University; B.A. (Finance), Renmin University of China. 
1
Burke et al.: Masters of the Universe: Bid Rigging by Private Equity Firms in M
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
30 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
Introduction ............................................................................................ 31 
Demonstrating Plus Factors to Prove the Existence of and Impact 
from Collusion in the Private Equity Market .............................. 33 
The Private Equity Industry ......................................................... 33 
Market Allocation and Bid rigging .............................................. 36 
Using Auction Theory to Demonstrate Antitrust Impact ............ 38 
Using Auction Theory to Demonstrate Antitrust Damages ......... 39 
Conclusions ............................................................................................ 41 
APPENDIX I FACTORS ...................................................................... 42 
Plus factor 1: Inefficiency in the auctions ................................... 42 
Plus factor 2: Winning bids below the estimated competitive 
price ........................................................................................ 44 
Table 2 ......................................................................................... 45 
Independent Plus Factor 2: Winning Bid Below the 
Estimated Competitive Price .................................................. 45 
Plus factor 3: Redistribution of gains and losses ......................... 46 
Table 3 ......................................................................................... 47 
Independent Plus Factor 3: Redistribution of Gains and 
Losses ..................................................................................... 47 
Table 3 (cont.) ............................................................................. 48 
Independent Plus Factor 3: Redistribution of Gains and 
Losses ..................................................................................... 48 
Plus factor 4: Bid reduction below competitive benchmark 
prices ...................................................................................... 49 
Plus factor 5: Communication and monitoring ............................ 49 
Table 4 ......................................................................................... 51 
Independent Plus Factor 5: Communication And Monitoring .... 51 
Table 4(cont.) .............................................................................. 52 
Independent Plus Factor 5: Communication And Monitoring .... 52 
Table 4(cont.) .............................................................................. 53 
Independent Plus Factor 5: Communication And Monitoring .... 53 
Plus factor 6: Large club deals reduce number of bidders........... 54 
Table 5 ......................................................................................... 55 
Independent Plus Factor 6: Large Club Deals Reduce 
Number Of Bidders ................................................................ 55 
Table 6 ......................................................................................... 57 
Independent Plus Factor 6: Large Club Deals Reduce 
Number Of Bidders ................................................................ 57 
Summary of Plus Factors ............................................................. 58 
Appendix II: Damages Analysis ............................................................ 59 
IRRs but for the Market Allocation and Bid rigging 
Agreement .............................................................................. 59 
Estimating the But-For Competitive IRRs Using CAPM ........... 59 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss1/2
2018] BID RIGGING BY PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS 31 
Estimating the But-For Competitive IRRs Using Information 
Provided in Ewens et al. ......................................................... 63 
Estimating PE Firms’ But-For Equity Valuations Per Share ...... 63 
Damages Using the CAPM to Estimate But-For Competitive 
IRRs ....................................................................................... 63 
Table 1 ......................................................................................... 65 
Amc Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 15.59% ...................... 65 
Table 2 ......................................................................................... 66 
Aramark Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR= 13.46% ................. 66 
Table 3 ......................................................................................... 67 
Freescale Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 19.57% ............... 67 
Table 4 ......................................................................................... 68 
Harrah’s Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 17.02% ................ 68 
Table 5 ......................................................................................... 69 
HCA Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 13.71% ..................... 69 
Table 6 ......................................................................................... 70 
Kinder Morgan Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 14.38% ..... 70 
Table 7 ......................................................................................... 71 
Sungard Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 17.14% ................ 71 
Table 8 ......................................................................................... 72 
TXU Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 15.68% ...................... 72 
Table 9 ......................................................................................... 73 
Antitrust Damages Analysis Summary........................................ 73 
Appendix III: Equity Valuation Methodology ....................................... 74 
Methodology I: Using PE Firm’s Exit EV/EBITDA Multiple .... 74 
Step 1: Estimating equity investment (𝐸0) ..................... 74 
Step 2: Estimating the total purchase price (𝑇𝑃𝑃0) ........ 75 
Step 3: Estimating the equity valuation per share ........... 75 
Methodology II: Using PE Firm’s Exit P/E Multiple .................. 76 
Methodology III: Using PE Firm’s Segment Exit Multiples ....... 76 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, after nearly seven years of litigation, a shareholder class of 
investors settled their antitrust claims against some of the world’s largest 
private equity (“PE”) firms – Bain Capital Partners, Blackstone Group, 
Carlyle, Goldman Sachs, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Silver Lake 
Technology Management, and TPG Capital – who agreed to pay $590.5 
million.1 The case arose from an article in the Wall Street Journal 
 
  1. Andrew Harris, Buyout Firms’ $590 Million Collusion Settlement Approved, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2014, 1:50 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-
30/buyout-firms-590-million-collusion-settlement-approved. 
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reporting that the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) sent a letter asking certain PE firms to provide it with 
information regarding bidding for the acquisition of companies. 
Ultimately, the DOJ declined to bring action for alleged antitrust 
violations.2 In 2007, a proposed class of shareholders alleged that the 
world’s largest PE firms had violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, by 
conspiring to suppress the prices paid to shareholders in several large 
leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”).3 The case was unusual in that the 
shareholder class alleged an overarching conspiracy by a buyers’ cartel 
that did not involve the purchase of a commodity, but instead involved 
fairly unique and complex LBOs of large public corporations. The use of 
club deals (i.e., agreements among PE firms to share capital, valuations, 
and sector expertise) reduced the number of bidders and provided an 
environment conducive to collusion. 
While the case was notable for both its size and subject matter,4 it was 
likewise novel in the way it demonstrated impact and harm: through the 
use of auction theory. Regression analysis has been a common means of 
demonstrating antitrust injury5 and one scholar used the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) to demonstrate whether these private equity 
acquisitions should be viewed as anticompetitive.6 However, the use of 
auction theory in the class action permitted the claimants not only to 
demonstrate injury and damages, but also to develop “plus factors” 
demonstrating the “concerted action” requirement of a Section 1 claim. 
The economic analyses, combined with the record of contemporaneous 
communications and deposition testimony, demonstrate that the seven 
major private equity firms7 entered into a market allocation and bid 
rigging agreement from 2003 to 2007 that reduced the prices paid in eight 
multibillion-dollar LBOs by $11.97 billion. In this article, we explain how 
auction theory was used to show the existence of a market allocation and 
 
  2. White & Case LLP, A Recent Court Decision Revives Concern That Some Club Deals Could 
Violate the Antitrust Laws, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 5, 2009), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ab238d4b-9ba0-4093-a58b-4ec0df4538f6.  
  3. Complaint at 1-2, Davidson v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-EFH (D. 
Mass. filed Dec. 28, 2007). 
  4. For a discussion of the rise of bid rigging cartel behavior worldwide and the effect of fines 
on deterrence, see Emilie Dargaud, Andrea Mantovani & Carlo Reggiani, Cartel Punishment and the 
Distortive Effects of Fines, 12 J. OF COMPETITION LAW & ECON. 375 (2016). 
  5. See, e.g., Lawrence Wu, ECONOMETRICS: LEGAL, PRACTICAL, AND TECHNICAL ISSUES 341-
70 (2d ed. 2014). 
  6. Jon Fougner, Comment, Antitrust Enforcement in Private Equity: Target, Bidder, and Club 
Sizes Should Matter, 31 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 25 (Oct. 6, 2013). 
  7. Complaint at 4-6, Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass. Dec. 
28, 2007). (Defendant private equity firms included Bain Capital Partners, Blackstone Group, Carlyle 
Group, Goldman Sachs Group, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Silver Lake Technology Management, 
and TPG Capital). 
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bid rigging agreement that resulted in antitrust impact and damages.8 
DEMONSTRATING PLUS FACTORS TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF AND 
IMPACT FROM COLLUSION IN THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET 
While auction theory has been proposed as a way to obtain optimal 
results in the market for corporate control,9 the Dahl case was the first 
prominent instance of the use of auction theory to demonstrate antitrust 
injury and damages. Game theory, which auction theory is a form of, has 
been introduced into merger analysis since the 1992 revision of the 
Merger Guidelines,10 including its application to coordinated interactions 
(for example, collusion in the market).11 Plaintiffs in antitrust actions 
often rely on regression analysis to demonstrate antitrust injury and 
damages.12 Dahl, however, was the first reported example of the use of 
auction theory to demonstrate the existence of plus factors as proof of 
conspiracy along with demonstrating the degree of harm resulting from 
the collusion. 
We begin with an overview of the private equity industry, followed by 
a discussion of the dynamics of market allocation and bid rigging. We 
then apply auction theory to demonstrate the existence of antitrust 
violations in the Dahl case and the degree of harm resulting from the 
collusion. 
The Private Equity Industry 
A PE firm is a partnership or limited liability corporation that raises 
equity capital through PE funds.13 In a typical PE transaction where the 
PE firm buys a company, the buyout is financed 60% to 90% with debt—
hence the term leveraged buyout—and 10% to 40% with funds from 
investors, including principals at the PE firms.14 In an LBO, purchasers, 
often PE firms, acquire most of a company’s outstanding shares with a 
substantial amount of debt financing. Purchasers then take the company 
 
  8. Authors Christopher M. Burke, Stephanie A. Hackett, and David W. Mitchell served as 
counsel and authors Simon J. Wilke, Michael A. Williams and Wei Zhao as testifying and consulting 
experts, respectively, for Plaintiffs in the action. 
  9. Christina M. Sautter, Auction Theory and Standstills: Dealing with Friends and Foes in a 
Sale of Corporate Control, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 521 (2013). 
  10. Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Daubert, Science, and Modern Game Theory: 
Implications for Merger Analysis, 20 S. CT. ECON. REV. 125, 126 (2012). 
  11. U.S. Dept. of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 62 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1559, Section 2.2 (1992). 
  12. See, e.g., supra note 5.  
  13. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. OF ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 121, 122 (2009). 
  14. Id. at 125. 
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private by withdrawing their shares from the public exchange and operate 
it for a period of time. Thereafter, the purchasers sell it to a strategic rival 
or other PE firm or they conduct an initial public offering (“IPO”) and 
return ownership to the public markets. 
LBO activity boomed in the early 1980s, slowed in the 1990s, and 
thrived again starting in 2001.15 The value of PE LBO deals in the U.S. 
surged from $30 billion in 2001 to over $450 billion in 2007.16 In 2006 
and 2007, PE funds exceeded 1% of the U.S. stock market’s value.17 
However, LBO activity stagnated in 2008 due to the Great Recession and 
the resulting freeze in the credit markets upon which PE firms depend. 
Since the first LBO boom in the 1980s, PE LBOs have evolved to 
become less associated with “hostile takeovers.” Instead, PE firms more 
typically cooperate with incumbent boards of directors and their officers 
to cultivate relationships to effectuate “friendly takeovers.”18 As a result, 
their holdings have expanded to include companies in the financial 
services, technology, healthcare, manufacturing, and retail industries.19 
Throughout the 2001-2007 boom, PE firms shifted their focus from 
primarily purchasing noncore business units of large public companies to 
buying public companies as a whole.20 PE firms have also increasingly 
partaken in “club deals,” which are joint agreements between two or more 
PE firms to pool their resources, expertise, and investment funds’ capital 
to buy target companies.21 Of the ten largest completed club deal LBOs 
of U.S. target companies since 2000, all of the deals included at least one 
of the named Defendants in Dahl and six of the ten LBOs were proprietary 
club deals that formed part of the overarching conspiracy in Dahl.22 Club 
deals surged in 2004, peaked in 2007, and accounted for 44% of the $1.05 
trillion total LBO deal value in the 2000 to 2007 period.23 
Developments in the PE industry sparked debates and criticisms of PE 
 
  15. Micah S. Officer, Oguzhan Ozbas & Berk A. Sensoy, Club Deals in Leveraged Buyouts, 
98 J. OF FIN. ECON. 214, 214 (2010). 
  16. Id. 
  17. Supra note 13, at 125.  
  18. One example of a “friendly takeover” was in the SunGuard LBO, where Silver Lake 
cultivated a relationship with the SunGard board of directors and executives. In addition to managements’ 
participation in the buyout, five-year employment contracts were negotiated with the top seven executives, 
which offered the executives the opportunity to invest up to $35 million of their proceeds from the sale of 
the company into new company stock, and included a 15% incentive equity stake of the new company 
stock. Redacted Fifth Amended Complaint at 69, Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 1:07-cv-12388 (D. 
Mass. Oct. 10, 2012). 
  19. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-885, PRIVATE EQUITY: RECENT GROWTH 
IN LEVERAGED BUYOUTS EXPOSED RISKS THAT WARRANT CONTINUED ATTENTION 10 (2008). 
  20. Felix Barber & Michael Goold, The Strategic Secret of Private Equity, 85 HARV. BUS. 
REV. 53, 56 (2007). 
  21. Supra note 19, at 5.  
  22. Id. at 27.  
  23. Id. at 24-25.  
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activities, especially club deals. One criticism is that PE firms can collude 
through club deals to depress acquisition prices by limiting the number of 
firms bidding in an auction.24 Even without collusion, clubbing can 
decrease competition by reducing the number of bids and, consequently, 
lower premiums for target companies’ shareholders.25 PE executives 
argue that club deals form primarily because one firm may not have 
sufficient capital in funds to buy companies alone or may face constraints 
on how much capital can be invested in one LBO. Some executives claim 
that club deals allow bids that would not otherwise be possible, and 
therefore, increase competition.26 The financial media began voicing 
concerns about club deals in 2005, and the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division opened an investigation into this practice in 2006.27 
The United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) 
conducted an analysis that looked at public-to-private LBOs completed 
from 1998 to 2007 and, after controlling for differences in target 
companies, found that such club deals, in aggregate, were not associated 
with lower or higher per share price premiums. The GAO found no 
evidence of an anticompetitive effect on acquisition prices.28 However, 
the GAO warned that its conclusions were based on an association, not a 
causal relationship, between club deals and premiums. The GAO 
cautioned that its findings may not generalize to the overall population of 
club deals as it examined a subset of all PE deals.29 
Officer et al., by contrast, focused on club deals between January 1984 
and September 2007 that were worth more than $100 million.30 The 
rationale for examining this set of LBOs was that concerns regarding club 
deals were mainly associated with large LBOs completed by prominent 
PE firms.31 With this targeted sample, Officer et al. found that premiums 
in club deals were 40% lower than those in sole-sponsored LBOs.32 In 
response to such competitive concerns, shareholders of target companies 
 
  24. TPG’s founder David Bonderman observed that formation of “[c]onsortia . . . limits 
bidding” and ensures that “[there’s] less competition for the biggest deals.” Redacted Fifth Amended 
Complaint at 3, Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 1:07-cv-12388, (D. Mass. Oct. 10, 2012). A 
Blackstone executive wrote about Texas Genco that Blackstone’s message to TPG and KKR was “better 
for everyone to join forces and have a much higher chance of winning the deal and not drive the price 
up.” Id. at 84-85. KKR compared Texas Genco to SunGard, where “the large PE universe was all working 
together,” and “there was no competition.” Id. at 68. 
  25. Supra note 15, at 215. 
  26. Supra note 19, at 5.  
  27. Supra note 15, at 237.  
  28. Supra note 19, at 33-34.  
  29. Id. at 33.  
  30. Micah S. Officer, Oguzhan Ozbas & Berk A. Sensoy, Club Deals in Leveraged Buyouts, 
98 J. OF FIN. ECON. 214 (2010). 
  31. This sample includes deals completed by the end of November 2007. See supra note 14, at 
218.  
  32. Id. at 237.  
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filed antitrust lawsuits against PE firms.33  
Antitrust claims against PE firms had been notoriously difficult to 
make, with at least one court looking at club deals and declining to find 
that the claim had been stated.34 Dahl35 advanced a novel theory that 
posited a conspiracy beyond an agreement to fix the price of a single 
LBO. In Dahl, the Plaintiffs accused the major PE firms of violating 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act by forming an illegal market allocation and 
bid rigging to fix the prices of the largest LBOs through the use of, inter 
alia, club deals.36 In a market allocation agreement, competitors divide 
markets among themselves. In a bid rigging agreement, by contrast, 
competitors decide who will be chosen to win a bid on a contract instead 
of allowing the competitive bidding process to determine the winner. 
Market Allocation and Bid rigging 
The Sherman Act has, as its premise, the notion that competition “will 
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the 
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time 
providing an environment conducive to the presentation of our 
democratic political and social institutions.”37 Collusive agreements, such 
as price-fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation, unreasonably restrict 
competitive conditions and harm consumers. Section 1 of the Act 
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, 
or with foreign nations.”38 Proving a violation of Section 1 requires proof 
of (1) the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy among two 
or more separate entities (2) that unreasonably restrains trade39 and (3) 
 
  33. Supra note 19, at 6.  
  34. See Pennsylvania Ave. Funds v. Borey, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134–35 (W.D. Wash. 2008) 
(court dismissed the antitrust claim for failure to state a claim under the Sherman Act); see also Finnegan 
v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 827-32 (2d Cir. 1990) (the Second Circuit held that the federal securities 
law precludes application of the antitrust laws to rival bidders that ultimately joined forces to acquire a 
target company). 
  35. No. 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass). 
  36. The Plaintiffs in Dahl presented record evidence of an overarching conspiracy to fix prices 
of large proprietary LBOs. After threatening one another’s proprietary club deals [HCA and Freescale], 
Tony James of Blackstone reported that “Henry Kravis [KKR] just called to say congratulations and that 
they were standing down because he had told me before they would not jump a signed deal of ours.” Tony 
James told George Roberts of KKR, “We would much rather work with you guys than against you. 
Together we can be unstoppable but in opposition we can cost each other a lot of money.” George Roberts 
responded, “Agreed.” After hearing the news that KKR agreed to stand down on Freescale, a Goldman 
Sachs executive observed “club etiquette prevails.” Redacted Fifth Amended Complaint at 142-43, Dahl 
v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass. filed Oct. 10, 2012). 
  37. Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
  38. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). 
  39. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (Section 1 prohibits only those 
restraints that unreasonably restrict competitive conditions). 
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affects interstate or foreign commerce.40 
When competitors collude and agree to concerted action, the consumer 
is harmed while the conspirators are unlawfully rewarded. Collusive 
agreements typically consist of three components. Conspirators (1) reach 
an agreement on terms of trade, (2) distribute the collusive gains via a 
market allocation agreement, and (3) monitor and enforce compliance.41 
Proving collusion is complicated by the fact that firms can act in parallel, 
consciously, without necessarily violating the Sherman Act.42 In 
oligopolies, for example, firms can act in parallel non-collusively because 
they understand their roles in a repeated game.43 Therefore, to prove that 
a Section 1 conspiracy exists, a plaintiff must show more evidence than 
the defendants’ parallel action—a plaintiff must be able to prove that the 
defendants acted in parallel pursuant to a collusive agreement.44 
While collusion can be proven with either direct or circumstantial 
evidence,45 direct proof is understandably scarce when documenting 
unlawful conspiracies.46 Detecting market allocation and bid rigging 
agreements, like other Section 1 violations, is generally difficult because 
collusive agreements are typically reached in secret and rarely leave a trail 
of direct evidence that demonstrates concerted action. Of course, as 
Judges Posner and Easterbrook observed, “conspiracies organized so that 
they do not produce evidence of actual communications are no less 
harmful than conspiracies that leave a trail of such evidence.”47  
As a result, claimants “typically must prove other facts and 
circumstances (often referred to as ‘plus factors’) in combination with 
conscious parallelism to support an inference of concerted action.”48 Plus 
factors are circumstantial evidence of actions or conduct “highly unlikely 
to occur in the absence of a collusive agreement.”49 The most important 
 
  40. See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. V. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 824 (6th Cir. 2011). For a discussion, 
see 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2 (8th ed. 2017). 
  41. William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors 
and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 408 (2011). 
  42. See, e.g., Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004). 
  43. Supra note 41, at 393. See also ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN 
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 267-68 (2d ed. 2008). 
  44. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) (“conscious parallelism” is “not in itself 
unlawful”); Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) 
(“[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the 
traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but ‘conscious parallelism’ has not read conspiracy out of 
the Sherman Act entirely”). 
  45. 1 ABA SECTION ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 6 (8th ed. 2017). 
  46. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 676, 720 (1965) (“Only rarely 
will there be direct evidence of an express agreement” in conspiracy cases). 
  47. RICHARD POSNER & FRANK EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND 
OTHER MATERIALS 341 (2d ed. 1981). 
  48. Supra note 45, at 11.  
  49. Supra note 41, at 405.  
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plus factors generally show that an action or conduct would be contrary 
to the conspirators’ self-interests had they acted alone.50 
The Defendant firms in Dahl were comprised of highly educated 
individuals, many with MBAs, PhDs, and law degrees from elite 
institutions. They worked with lawyers at top defense law firms regularly 
and accessed capital from the largest money center banks in the world.  
These were not individuals who were going to simply broadcast their 
intent to violate a statute that includes criminal penalties. Thus, economic 
analysis was going to be a critical element for the Plaintiffs to prove the 
existence of an unlawful agreement.    
Using Auction Theory to Demonstrate Antitrust Impact 
In Dahl there was traditional evidence, such as email communications 
and internal firm memoranda, to prove an agreement among the PE firms 
to allocate the LBO market and rig bids. The case was compelling, 
however, because of the development of plus factors through the use of 
auction theory. 
Auction theory states that if a market is competitive, the price should 
rise until there remains only one bidder.51 This has several empirical 
implications, including: (1) the bidder with the highest valuation should 
win, i.e., the sale is efficient; (2) the valuation of the second highest bidder 
should set the winning price; and (3) since the winning price is below the 
winner’s valuation, the winner’s expected profit increases as its 
ownership share of the winning deal increases. 
In the presence of collusion, e.g., a bidding ring or buyers’ cartel, 
auction theory has a number of contrasting empirical implications, 
including: (1) it is impossible to obtain full efficiency, so a bidder with a 
valuation below the highest valuation will win sometimes; (2) when the 
cartel operates successfully, the winning bid is below the second-highest 
valuation; and (3) the cartel needs some arrangement to spread the 
benefits of the lower winning bid among the non-winning bidders. These 
contrasting characteristics describe the present case and indicate the 
presence of collusion. 
In Dahl, auction theory was used to demonstrate the existence of six 
plus factors: (1) inefficiency in the auctions; (2) winning bids below the 
estimated competitive price; (3) redistribution of gains and losses; (4) bid 
reduction below competitive benchmark prices; (5) communication and 
monitoring; and (6) large club deals reduced the number of bidders.52 The 
 
  50. Id. 
  51. See, e.g., R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. OF ECON. 
LITERATURE 699 (1987). 
  52. No. 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass), Document 1020-2, pp. 25-27, 31.  
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ability to demonstrate multiple plus factors allows the determination of 
whether firms’ actions are more likely than not the result of an agreement 
to be made more precisely.53 The six plus factors, in combination with 
parallel conduct among PE firms, supported an inference of concerted 
action in Dahl. When considering the plus factors jointly across the 
totality of the deals, along with the nature of the repeated interactions of 
the market participants, the economic analyses show that the PE firms’ 
conduct was (1) consistent with coordinated behavior and inconsistent 
with competition and (2) more likely than not the result of a market 
allocation and bid rigging agreement. That is, the economic evidence 
tended to exclude the possibility that the PE firms acted independently. 
Further descriptions along with the underlying analyses of these plus 
factors are contained in Appendix I. 
Using Auction Theory to Demonstrate Antitrust Damages 
In addition to using auction theory to develop plus factors (and 
therefore evidence of collusion), Dahl is notable for its use of auction 
theory to demonstrate antitrust injury and to quantify damages. The 
analysis was premised on the proposition that the PE firms’ conduct in a 
given LBO transaction resulted in antitrust impact and damage to class 
members if the actual price was less than the but-for competitive price. 
The issues of impact and damages were circular; if the auction prices 
hadn’t been suppressed, there would be no impact and consequently no 
damages. Calculating damages was simply a matter of measuring the delta 
of what should have been paid per share (had there been no collusion) 
multiplied by the number of affected shares.   
The damages methodology determined the competitive price of each 
LBO transaction by estimating the PE firms’ equity valuations per share 
but for the alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. A PE 
firm’s but-for equity valuation per share for a transaction equaled the 
maximum price per share it was willing to pay given the but-for 
competitive internal rate of return (“IRR”), i.e., the IRR that would have 
prevailed but for the alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. 
According to economic theory, if a market is competitive, the price 
should rise to the point where supply equals demand. In the case where a 
single unit is for sale, such as a firm, price rises because of competition 
to the point where only a single bidder remains.54 This has several 
 
  53. See, e.g., supra note 41, at 393. 
  54. See, e.g., Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON. 
REV. 180, 180 (1996) (“In an absolute English auction, in which the price rises continuously until only 
one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid, the sale price equals the lowest 
competitive price at which supply equals demand.”). 
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empirical implications, including (1) the bidder with the highest valuation 
should win and (2) the valuation of the second-highest bidder should set 
the winning price. For example, suppose there were three potential buyers 
of a given item. Each buyer has a maximum willingness to pay for the 
item, so one of the buyers has the highest willingness to pay. The seller’s 
goal is to obtain the highest price. To induce the seller to sell the item, the 
buyer with the highest willingness to pay has to offer slightly more than 
the buyer with the second-highest willingness to pay. Applied to this case, 
this means the competitive price equals the second highest equity 
valuation per share. 
In a seminal article for which he won the Nobel Prize in Economics, 
William Vickrey55 showed that under standard economic assumptions, 
many auction formats are equivalent in the sense that (1) the formats end 
up with the same rule regarding who wins the object and (2) the expected 
pricing rule is the same. In particular, for all the auction formats 
considered by Professor Vickrey, the sale mechanism is efficient, i.e., the 
entity with the highest value for the object gets it and so rule (1) is 
determined. Moreover, the expected price paid is exactly equal to the 
second-highest valuation and so the pricing rule (2) is uniquely 
determined. This cornerstone result is known as the “Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem.”56 A well-known and highly successful 
application of auction theory is the Federal Communications 
Commission’s (“FCC”) sale of radio spectrum.57 
Based on the above economic analyses, the damages methodology 
proceeds as follows. Economic theory establishes that, for each 
transaction, the competitive price equals the second highest equity 
valuation per share. Using the PE firms’ own valuation models for each 
 
  55. William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. OF 
FIN. 8 (1961). 
  56. See, e.g., PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 16-19 (2004); VIJAY 
KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY 27-34 (2d ed. 2010). 
  57. See, About Auctions, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=about_auctions (“Since 1994, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted auctions of licenses for electromagnetic spectrum. . 
. . The Commission has found that spectrum auctions more effectively assign licenses than either 
comparative hearings or lotteries. The auction approach is intended to award the licenses to those who 
will use them most effectively. Additionally, by using auctions, the Commission has reduced the average 
time from initial application to license grant to less than one year, and the public is now receiving the 
direct financial benefit from the award of licenses. . . . In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress 
extended and expanded the FCC’s auction authority.”). See also R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan & 
Simon Wilkie, The Greatest Auction in History, in BETTER LIVING THROUGH ECONOMICS, 168, 181-82 
(John J. Siegfried, ed., 2009) (“Academic economists, working with FCC staff and especially FCC 
economist Evan Kwerel, created an auction form that has been used to sell over $100 billion dollars of 
spectrum in dozens of countries. The design reflected trade-offs that were understood only because of the 
development of auction theory in the 1980s and thus implemented recent innovations in economic 
analysis. The FCC auction performed well by a variety of measures and seems to have balanced revenue 
and efficiency.”). 
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LBO, the PE firms’ equity valuations per share were calculated but for 
the alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. This analysis 
reveals the competitive price of each transaction since that price equals 
the second-highest valuation. These damages calculations, reported in 
detail in Appendix II, show what the IRRs would have been if not for the 
alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. The total classwide 
damages across the disputed LBO transactions equal approximately 
$11.97 billion. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Dahl case extends the use of economic analysis, and specifically 
auction theory, in antitrust matters, including class action cases. In 
particular, the Dahl case extends the use of economic analysis in antitrust 
by using auction theory to (1) specify and empirically test plus factors 
used to evaluate the likelihood of collusion; (2) provide a methodology 
utilizing evidence common to class members to demonstrate that 
members of a proposed class incurred a common impact as a result of the 
alleged collusive conduct; and (3) provide a methodology based on 
generally accepted economics that can be used reliably to quantify 
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APPENDIX I FACTORS  
Plus factor 1: Inefficiency in the auctions  
The LBO auctions were inefficient: the bidder with the highest 
valuation did not win the sale. This fact is inconsistent with models of 
competitive behavior since under competition, competing bidders bid up 
to their individual valuations. In contrast, auction theory predicts that 
auctions will be inefficient when a cartel exists. In particular, if the values 
of the two highest bidders are very close, the cartel will select a lower 
valuation bidder to win the auction. 
The Plaintiffs in Dahl calculated a bidders’ gross value of winning the 
transaction from that bidder’s data (when available). For the purpose of 
the calculations, we assume a standard LBO plan of purchasing the target 
firm with a given leverage ratio and holding the target firm for five years 
before exiting. This is a common time horizon in the analyses undertaken 
by PE firms. The PE firm with the highest enterprise exit valuation of the 
target firm after five years should have been able to offer the highest 
initial equity premium. Therefore, we identify the PE firm with the 
highest enterprise exit value as the high-value bidder. 
Freescale, HCA, Kinder Morgan, and TXU were “strongly” inefficient, 
i.e., the bidder with the highest valuation is not in the winning club (see 
Table 1). AMC, Aramark, Harrah’s, and SunGard, were “partially” 
inefficient, i.e., even though the highest-valuation bidder was a member 
of the winning club, at least one bidder that did not have the highest 
valuation was also a member of the winning club. This economic 
evidence is contrary to what is expected in a competitive setting, 
suggesting that competition in these auctions was suppressed. These 
actions constitute a plus factor—that is, actions or conduct (in this case a 
significant number of the auctions being inefficient) unlikely to occur in 
the absence of a collusive agreement. These findings provide evidence of 
bidder collusion in the transactions. 
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Table 1 
Independent Plus Factor 1: Inefficiency in the LBOs 
  
PE Firm with the Highest 






value? Transaction PE Firm 
Equity 
Valuation 




AMC Apollo 834.8 
Apollo 834.8 Yes 





Sachs 6,497.4 No 
J.P. Morgan 6,506.4 Yes 









er Lake 19,047.3 







TPG 15,666.6 No 
Harrah’s TPG 17,745.8 
Apollo XXX XXX 


























Bain 11,038.7 No 
Blackstone 10,301.7 No 
Goldman 
Sachs XXX XXX 
KKR 10,227.2 No 
Providence XXX XXX 
Silver Lake 11,259.4 Yes 
TPG 10,990.7 No 
TXU Apollo 34,589.7 
Goldman 
Sachs 31,361.4 No 
J.P. Morgan 32,366.8 No 
KKR 30,993.1 No 
TPG 32,244.3 No 
Notes:      
“XXX” indicates that there was no sufficient information to estimate an equity valuation for the PE 
firm.  All valuation estimates are based on the CAPM methodology described in Section VI.B. 
 
Source:      
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1020-2 (D. Mass. filed 
Aug. 12, 2014), at 28. 
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Plus factor 2: Winning bids below the estimated competitive price 
The second type of conduct against a firm’s unilateral self-interest 
related to the existence of winning bids below the estimated competitive 
price. Competition in an ascending auction determines a winning bid that 
is greater than the second-highest valuation. Consider an auction in which 
the winning bid b is less than the second-highest valuation v. By bidding 
b+ε, where ε is a negligibly small number, the bidder with valuation v can 
win the auction. Therefore, by not submitting a competing bid, the bidder 
with valuation v forgoes a surplus equal to v – b – ε. Thus, a winning bid 
less than the second-highest valuation shows that the firms engaged in 
actions against their unilateral economic self-interests, absent the 
existence of an agreement. 
If the market for large LBOs were competitive, the acquisition price 
would be forced up to the point where the bidder with the second-highest 
valuation would just earn a competitive rate of return. Since the target 
firms were large publicly traded firms, the opportunity cost for an investor 
is purchasing a portfolio of stocks. So, for example, one might take the 
long-run rate of return on the S&P 500 index as a benchmark competitive 
rate of return. In the following analysis, the Plaintiffs used 10% as the 
competitive rate of return. Note that at this price, the winner of the 
transaction expects to exceed a 10% rate of return. 
We conclude that in all eight of LBOs, the winning bid was less than 
the estimated competitive price (see Table 2). The weighted-average of 
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Table 2 




PE Firm with the Second-Highest 







e price? Transaction PE Firm 
Equity 
Valuatio
n ($ mil) 
Estimated 
Competitiv


















T. H. Lee 
Warburg 
Pincus 









Sachs 17,400.7 17,400.7 
Apollo 16,699.
3 Yes TPG 









































Source: Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1020-2 (D. Mass. 
filed Aug. 12, 2014), at 29. 
17
Burke et al.: Masters of the Universe: Bid Rigging by Private Equity Firms in M
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
46 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
Plus factor 3: Redistribution of gains and losses 
In any cartel, a redistribution mechanism to share the profits among 
members is required. This is especially true in the case of a bid rigging 
agreement where the items being purchased are relatively costly 
individual units purchased infrequently. In particular, if a bidder in an 
individual auction “stands down,” and drops out when the price is 
significantly below their valuation, then they are leaving money on the 
table and granting the profit to another bidder, i.e., the winner. 
This action is against their unilateral self-interest absent some 
compensation mechanism. For example, the bidder who stood down 
could be rewarded with a quid pro quo in future auctions or receive a side 
payment in the current auction. Such a side payment could involve being 
brought into the winning club in the current deal or receiving some other 
financial benefit from the current deal. 
In an ascending auction with private bidder values, competing bidders 
bid up to their individual valuations. Therefore, no losing bidder would 
want to join the “winning club” bid because that would imply that such a 
bidder obtains a negative surplus. Many auctions resulted in deals in 
which non-winning PE firms were brought into the deal. Thus, the PE 
firms appeared to be acting against their unilateral self-interests in that the 
winning bidder invited the losing bidders into the club to share the 
benefits. 
In the case of ascending auctions with a common value component, 
auction theory shows that lower-value bidders may want to join the 
winning bid, since in this case the high-value bidder has a strategy that 
ensures a positive profit when winning the auction. However, in this case, 
the winning bidder would act against its unilateral self-interest (in the 
absence of an agreement) by sharing its profits with other, lower-
valuation bidders. 
In six of the eight LBOs (AMC, Aramark, Freescale, Harrah’s, Kinder 
Morgan, SunGard), non-winning PE firms were invited into the 
transaction (i.e., asked to join and either did or did not join). In three of 
the eight LBOs (Aramark, Freescale, Harrah’s), non-winning PE firms 
were brought into the transaction (i.e., asked to join and accepted). These 
actions constitute a plus factor—that is, actions or conduct (in this case 
winners inviting non-winning Defendant PE firms into a transaction) 
unlikely to occur in the absence of a collusive agreement. These findings 
provide evidence of bidder collusion in the transactions. 
18
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss1/2
2018] BID RIGGING BY PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS 47 
Table 3 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
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Plus factor 4: Bid reduction below competitive benchmark prices 
 As Kovacic et al. discuss: 
 
The primary way to determine whether any bids at a procurement, 
or a set of procurements, came from an explicit cartel requires a 
benchmark that is considered noncollusive. A benchmark could be 
a time period, a geographic region, or a related but separate 
product. The analytic requirements are substantial when evaluating 
bid data relative to a benchmark. If that analysis is done well, the 
results can constitute a super plus factor—that is, actions or 
conduct (in this case, pricing) that are highly unlikely to occur in 
the absence of a collusive agreement. One way to do this analysis 
well requires that a reliable predictive econometric model be 
estimated for a benchmark, usually a time period, where conduct 
is thought to be noncollusive.58 
 
The findings of Officer et al. (2010) provide economic evidence on this 
plus factor.59 In particular, they show that, on average, the premium paid 
in club deals by large PE firms (which include Defendants in Dahl) in 
transactions over $100 million is statistically significantly lower by 
approximately 40% than premiums in non-club deals. In contrast, Boone 
and Mulherin,60 and Comment61 consider the effect of club deals in 
transactions above and below $100 million (which includes bids from 
many relatively small PE firms who were not defendants in Dahl) and 
find that club deals do not result in lower premiums than non-club deals. 
Thus, the economics literature suggests that club deals do not lower 
premiums, all else equal, when the sample includes relatively small 
transactions. In contrast, club deals lead to lower premiums, all else equal, 
when the transactions are restricted to larger dollar values. The 40% lower 
premiums, all else equal, found by Officer et al. constitute a plus factor—
that is, pricing behavior unlikely to occur in the absence of a collusive 
agreement.62 
Plus factor 5: Communication and monitoring 
Communication among bidders is integral to the successful operation 
 
 58. See, e.g., supra note 41, at 420. 
 59. Supra note 15. 
 60. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Do Private Equity Consortiums Facilitate Collusion 
in Takeover Bidding?, 17 J. OF CORP. FIN. 1475 (2011). 
 61. Robert Comment, Team Bidding by Private Equity Sponsors: Are the Antitrust Allegations 
Plausible?” 23 J. OF APPLIED FIN. 111 (2013). 
 62. See, e.g., supra note 41, at 393. 
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of a cartel. As Kovacic et al. discuss: 
 
Communication is a central part of the operation of a cartel. We 
are concerned with communication that reflects the ongoing nature 
of the conspiracy. In general, if a seller (receiver) knows something 
about another seller (sender) an immediate question arises: Was 
there no legitimate unilateral function for the sender in 
communicating such information to the receiver? Overall, 
information is a valuable commodity. For one seller to know 
information about a rival is to give that seller a competitive 
advantage. A competitor has no unilateral interest in 
disadvantaging itself relative to its rivals.63 
 
The economic evidence shows that each of the Defendant PE firms 
exchanged types of information that would not be in their unilateral self-
interest to exchange absent the existence of an agreement. For example, 
the firms exchanged information at times in the bidding for a given LBO 
that would not be in their unilateral self-interests absent the existence of 
an agreement on bid levels and bid strategy with ostensible horizontal 
competitors. A compendium of examples of such communications is 
presented in Table 4. 
  
 
 63. Id. at 423. 
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Table 4 
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Table 4(cont.) 
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Table 4(cont.) 
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Plus factor 6: Large club deals reduce number of bidders 
Plaintiffs’ alleged that Defendant PE firms formed clubs to reduce the 
already limited number of PE firms that could participate in a given LBO 
transaction.64 As discussed above, auction theory shows that a reduction 
in the number of bidders will, on average, lead to a reduction in the 
winning bid. To examine this claim, Plaintiffs’ expert economists 
conducted an empirical study of 3,080 LBOs in the United States 
completed in the period 1981 through July 2012. The sample consisted of 
all completed LBOs during this period for which data on the value of the 
transaction was publicly available.65 For each transaction, Plaintiffs’ 
expert economists identified the value of the transaction, the number of 
bidders, and the presence or absence of a club. A club is defined as present 
if more than one investor in the transaction is a financial sponsor or has a 
financial sponsor parent. The dependent variable (i.e., the variable to be 
explained) was a binary variable that equaled one if the number of bidders 
was two or more and zero if the number of bidders was one. The 
regression analysis allowed Plaintiffs’ expert economists to test 
empirically whether the presence of a club (on average) had a statistically 
significant effect on the dependent variable (i.e., whether the transaction 
had more than one bidder) controlling for the value of the transaction. The 
results of the regression analysis showed that the presence of a club led to 
a statistically significant reduction in the likelihood of having more than 
one bidder in a transaction, holding constant the value of the transaction 
(see Table 5, Model 1). We also find that this likelihood is reduced even 
further for larger transactions (see Table 5, Model 2). These findings show 
that the likelihood of a competing bid is significantly reduced in large 
club deals. 
 
 64. Redacted Fifth Amended Complaint at 2-3, Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners LLC, No. 1:07-cv-
12388-EFH (D. Mass. Oct. 10, 2012). 
 65. B. ESPEN ECKBO, 2 CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: MODERN EMPIRICAL DEVELOPMENTS, BIDDING 
STRATEGIES, FINANCING AND CORPORATE CONTROL 905, note 5 (2010) (“The dollar value of the 
transaction is the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. It includes 
the amount paid for all common stock, common stock equivalents, preferred stock, debt, options, assets, 
warrants, and stake purchases made within 6 months of the announcement date of the transaction. 
Assumed liabilities are included in the value if they are publicly disclosed. Preferred stock is included 
only if it is being acquired as part of a 100% acquisition. If a portion of the consideration paid by the 
acquirer is common stock, the stock is valued by using the closing price on the last full trading day before 
the announcement of the terms of the stock swap. If the exchange ratio of shares offered changes, the 
stock is valued based on its closing price on the last full trading date before the date of the exchange ratio 
change.”). 
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Table 5 
Independent Plus Factor 6: Large Club Deals Reduce Number Of 
Bidders 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 






Value of Transaction × 
Club 
  -1.60e-5*** 




Number of Observations 3,080 3,080 
F Statistic 26.6 24.5 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.02 
Source: Thomson One. 
Note: Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses.  Symbols ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 To further evaluate these results, we also split the 3,080 transactions 
into different groups based on their values. In particular, we split the 
transactions into two groups depending on whether the transaction value 
is less than $1 billion. The first row, second column of Table 5 shows that 
if the transaction value is less than $1 billion, then the fact that the 
winning bidder is a club has no statistically significant effect on whether 
there are two or more bidders. In contrast, the first row, third column of 
Table 5 shows that if the transaction value is greater than or equal to $1 
billion, the fact that the winning bidder is a club has a statistically 
significant and negative effect on whether there are two or more bidders. 
Table 6 shows similar results when the 3,080 transactions are split into 
two groups depending on whether the transaction value is less than $1.5 
billion, $2.0 billion, $2.5 billion, and $3.0 billion. In each case, the results 
show that if the transaction value is greater than or equal to a given dollar 
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amount, the fact that the winning bidder is a club has a statistically 
significant and negative effect on whether there are two or more bidders. 
In addition, these negative effects are larger in column 3 than in column 
2. That is, the negative effects are larger for the larger transaction values. 
These findings show that the likelihood of a competing bid is significantly 
reduced in large club deals, in fact the coefficient more than quadruples 
in size. As discussed above, economic theory shows that a reduction in 
the number of bidders will, on average, lead to a reduction in the winning 
bid. These findings provide evidence that the formation of clubs in large 
transactions reduced competition. 
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Table 6 
Independent Plus Factor 6: Large Club Deals Reduce Number Of 
Bidders 
Sample Split (S) Coefficient of Club Dummy 
















Source: Thomson One. 
Notes: 
The regression equation is Indicator (Number of Bidders > 1) = α + βX + ε, 
where X = [Value of the transaction, Club Dummy]. 
Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses.  Symbols ***, **, and * denote 
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Summary of Plus Factors 
To perform a thorough economic analysis to ascertain the likelihood of 
collusion, one cannot simply isolate a single plus factor. Rather, one must 
look at the economic evidence and plus factors as a whole to understand 
whether the possibility of independent (and therefore lawful) action tends 
to be excluded. When considering the plus factors jointly across the 
totality of the deals and the nature of the repeated interactions of the 
market participants, Plaintiffs’ expert economists found that their 
economic analyses showed that Defendants’ actions in the transactions at 
issue were consistent with coordinated behavior but inconsistent with 
competition. They also concluded the Defendants’ actions in the 
transactions at issue were more likely than not the result of a market 
allocation and bid rigging agreement. 
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APPENDIX II: DAMAGES ANALYSIS 
IRRs but for the Market Allocation and Bid rigging Agreement 
We next analyze the values PE firms would be willing to pay for the 
eight LBO transactions. A number of different inputs were employed in 
the PE firms’ analyses, e.g., debt structure, dividend schedule, exit 
multiple, interest rate, management options, and required cash. The IRRs 
of the PE firms would have been inflated during the conspiracy period 
because they were artificially lowering the sales prices of the eight 
transactions through their alleged market allocation and bid rigging 
agreement. Therefore, from a damages perspective, it was important to 
determine what the IRRs in the eight transactions would have been but 
for the alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. 
Within our auction-theoretic methodology, we present two approaches 
to estimate the but-for competitive IRRs. First, we employ the well-
accepted Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”). Second, we use 
calculations of PE firms’ IRRs provided by Ewen et al.66 The advantage 
of the CAPM approach is that it allows one to address the specific risks 
of each LBO separately using a well-accepted, common methodology. 
Using the average IRR earned by PE firms in their buyout funds to 
estimate the but-for competitive IRRs is consistent with investors having 
a common target return for PE funds. 
For these reasons, the CAPM approach provided a well-accepted, 
reliable, and common methodology for measuring damages on a 
classwide basis using information common to the proposed class that is 
more tailored to the specific characteristics of each LBO transaction. 
Using the average IRR earned by PE firms in their buyout funds provided 
a cross check on the CAPM approach on a classwide basis using 
information common to the proposed class. 
Estimating the But-For Competitive IRRs Using CAPM 
The CAPM is “the first, most famous, and (so far) most widely used 
model in asset pricing.”67 The CAPM was developed by William Sharpe 
and John Lintner,68 in work that was awarded a Nobel Prize. The CAPM 
 
 66. Michael Ewens, Charles Jones & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, The Price of Diversifiable Risk in 
Venture Capital and Private Equity, 26 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1854 (2013). 
 67. See JOHN H. COCHRANE, ASSET PRICING 152 (2005). 
 68. William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions 
of Risk, 19 J. OF FIN. 425 (1964); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risky Assets and the Selection of Risky 
Investment in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965); and John 
Lintner, Security Prices, Risky and Maximal Gains from Diversification, 20 J. OF FIN. 587 (1965). 
Professor Lintner passed away before the Nobel Prize was awarded to Professor Sharpe in 1990. 
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relates the expected return of an asset to the market rate of return, the risk-
free rate of return, and the asset’s risk.69 According to the CAPM the 
return on an asset equals: 
 
𝛼 + 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓), 
 
where 𝛼 measures the “excess return,” 𝑟𝑓 denotes the risk-free rate of 
return, 𝑟𝑚 denotes the expected market rate of return, and 𝛽 is a measure 
of the systematic risk of the asset’s return relative to the return on the 
market portfolio.70 A fundamental implication of the CAPM is that if the 
market is efficient in its use of information, then the predicted value of 𝛼, 
the excess return, equals zero. Thus, the variance in returns to a given 
asset is solely due to its riskiness. 
However, if the excess return 𝛼 for a PE firm equals zero, that implies 
that the PE firm delivers zero value to its investors over the market return. 
Thus, for each transaction, the Plaintiffs needed to estimate the 
competitive market return (i.e., the CAPM return) as well as the 𝛼 that a 
PE firm expects to earn in a competitive environment that would cover 
the sum of management fees, expenses, and any other additional returns. 
In this case, there was only one transaction, Freescale, for which a jump 
bid occurred when a group of Defendant PE firms allegedly attempted to 
“cheat” on the collusive agreement. We use this natural experiment to 
calibrate the expected excess return, 𝛼, required to generate a competitive 
IRR. Since Freescale had highest riskiness, i.e., 𝛽, among the LBO 
transactions, calculating the but-for competitive IRRs for the other seven 
transactions using the 𝛼 derived from the Freescale transaction was 
conservative. 
To estimate the but-for competitive IRR for each transaction using the 
CAPM methodology, we estimate the competitive excess return, 𝛼, as 
follows. The evidence on record demonstrated that by September 10, 
2006 the Freescale board of directors accepted a buyout offer share price 
of $38 submitted by Blackstone and its group.71 Later the same day, the 
group consisting of KKR, Silver Lake, Bain, and Apax Partners 
Worldwide, LLP (“KKR Group”) submitted a written indication of 
interest to the Freescale board for a price of $40.00-$42.00. It stated that 
“should the board elect to move forward and enter into a definitive 
agreement with the other consortium . . . we will immediately withdraw 
 
 69. See, e.g., supra note 67, at 3-33. 
 70. See, e.g., supra note 66, at 1870. 
 71. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., Schedule 14A (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
October 19, 2006 at 28), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1272547/000119312506210856/ddefm14a.htm (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2018); 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass), Document 1031, at n. 491. 
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our offer, and we have decided we would not participate in any 
subsequent market check or other exploratory process.”72 The letter also 
indicated that “[u]pon receiving access to due diligence information and 
meetings with management, we would consider increasing our valuation 
. . . .”73 The indication of interest “stressed the KKR/SLP Group’s view 
that it could pay more for the Company than any other buyer due to the 
synergies that they could generate by combining Freescale with the 
semiconductor business that it was under contract to acquire . . . .”74 The 
letter further acknowledged the KKR Group could generate over $500 
million in synergies through a combination of Philips and Freescale.75 
On September 14, 2006, the Blackstone group submitted a formal offer 
of $40 per share.76 Freescale’s board accepted the offer and entered into 
a definitive agreement with the Blackstone group on September 15, 
2006.77 Consistent with the KKR Group’s written indication of interest 
cited above, our analysis of the Defendant PE firms’ valuation models 
confirmed that the KKR Group was indeed the high value bidder but stood 
down and stopped bidding. Using the midpoint of the KKR Group’s stated 
opening range of offered share prices, we conclude that the but-for 
competitive price of the Freescale transaction equaled $41 per share. 
Hence, the but-for competitive IRR for the Freescale transaction was the 
IRR at which the equity valuation per share equals $41.78 If competition 
had continued, the price may have been even higher.79 
Next, the parameters of the CAPM using evidence common to the 
proposed class members. We estimate the risk-free rate of return, 𝑟𝑓, using 
data obtained from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.80 A 
 
 72. 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass.), Document 1031, ¶219. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Supra note 71. 
 75. 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass.), Document 1031, ¶219. 
 76. Supra note 71, at 30. 
 77. Id. at 31-32.  
 78. With regard to the Freescale transaction, the Plaintiffs noted that the effort by the KKR Group 
to “cheat” on the collusive agreement affected the process by which the ultimate price of the transaction 
was determined. Cheating by members of a cartel or bidding ring was common and detecting cheating 
and enforcing the collusive agreement was an important part of a successful cartel or bidding ring. See, 
e.g., ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND 
BIDDING RINGS, ch. 1, 2, 6 & 10 and especially pp. 103-104 (2012). Thus, the effect of the collusive 
agreement in lowering the actual price below the competitive price in the Freescale transaction was less 
than that in the other seven deals. 
 79. Alternatively, the Plaintiffs could have used the Blackstone valuation model with a share price 
of $41, which yields a competitive IRR of 18.12%. This would imply that, but for the market allocation 
and bid rigging agreement, Blackstone would have continued to bid until dropping out at $41 following 
the September 10, 2006 written indication of interest to the Freescale board from the KKR Group. In this 
case, the competitive price would equal the second highest valuation, i.e., $41 since KKR Group’s 
valuation is the highest. This approach would yield a lower competitive α for Freescale equal to 4.74%. 
As a result, total damages would increase. 
 80. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FRED ECONOMIC DATA, 10-Year 
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commonly used risk-free rate of return is the 10-year U.S. Treasury 
constant maturity rate. We use the latest date, on or before the LBO 
announcement date, for which the 10-year constant maturity rate was 
reported. We estimate the expected market rate of return, 𝑟𝑚, using S&P 
500 index data obtained from the data repository maintained by economist 
Professor Robert Shiller, winner of the 2013 Nobel Prize in Economics.81 
We use the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 
500 index for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index 
was introduced) to the month before the deal announcement date for the 
expected market rate of return. Each transaction’s risk measure, 𝛽, was 
estimated using data obtained from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (“CRSP”), a research center at the University of Chicago Booth 
School of Business that provides historical data on security prices and 
returns.82 We estimate 𝛽 using CRSP data for the five-year period up to 
six months prior to the announcement of the transaction. Having 
estimated the risk-free rate of return, the market rate of return, the risk 
measure 𝛽, and the competitive price for the Freescale transaction, we 
solve for 𝛼 and thus obtain the competitive but-for IRR for each 
transaction. 
Using the $40 valuation per share of the second highest bidder, i.e., 
Blackstone, yielded a but-for competitive IRR equal to 19.57% for 
Freescale. This IRR significantly exceeded the market rate of return83 as 
well as academic estimates of the average IRRs of PE firms, e.g., Ewens 
et al. and Ang and Sorenson.84 Since the CAPM predicted return for 
Freescale equaled 13.38%, i.e., when 𝛼 equals zero, we determine that the 
competitive 𝛼 for Freescale equals 6.19%.85 We then used Freescale’s 
competitive 𝛼 to calculate the competitive IRR of the other seven 
transactions. 
 
Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (DGS10), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DGS10. 
 81. ROBERT SHILLER, ONLINE DATA ROBERT SHILLER, Stock Market Data, 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. 
 82. About CRSP, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO BOOTH SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, CENTER FOR 
RESEARCH IN SECURITY PRICES, http://www.crsp.com/about-crsp. (“As one of the 12 Research and 
Learning Centers at Chicago Booth, CRSP bridges theory and practice with trusted data solutions. . . . 
Since 1960, CRSP has provided research-quality data to scholarly researchers and advanced the body of 
knowledge in finance, economics and related disciplines. Today, nearly 500 leading academic institutions 
in 35 countries rely on CRSP data for academic research and to support classroom instructions.”). 
 83. Supra note 81. 
 84. Andrew Ang & Morten Sorensen, Risks, Returns, and Optimal Holdings of Private Equity: A 
Survey of Existing Approaches, 2 Q. J. OF FIN. 1250011-1 (2012). 
 85. The Plaintiffs’ estimate of Freescale’s α was consistent with other estimates of excess return 
in the academic literature. See, e.g., Michael Ewens, Charles Jones & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, The Price 
of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital and Private Equity, 26 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1854 (2013). 
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Estimating the But-For Competitive IRRs Using Information Provided in 
Ewens et al. 
We determine the PE firms’ but-for competitive IRRs using 
information provided by Ewens, Jones, and Rhodes-Kropf.86 They 
reported that the annualized equal-weighted IRR of buyout funds for the 
period 1980 to 2007 was 13.24%.87 Based on the Defendant PE firms’ 
offering of limited partnership interests, we add the fund’s costs, e.g., 
management fees and carried interest, by requiring that a limited partner 
pay 20% annually to the fund’s general partners.88 Thus, To earn 13.24% 
after paying these fees, the limited partners in a fund must have earned 
16.55%, i.e., (1 – 0.20) x 16.55% = 13.24%. Therefore, the but-for 
competitive IRR equaled 16.55%. 
Estimating PE Firms’ But-For Equity Valuations Per Share 
We next estimate what the PE firms’ equity valuations per share for 
each LBO transaction would have been but for the alleged market 
allocation and bid rigging agreement. A PE firm’s but-for equity valuation 
per share for a transaction is the maximum price per share it is willing to 
pay, given the competitive but-for IRR. Appendix III provides a detailed 
description of the methodology used to estimate PE firms’ equity 
valuations per share for the eight transactions. 
Using the methodology described above, we estimate what the 
competitive prices in the eight transactions would have been but for the 
alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. For each LBO 
transaction, damages were the difference between the competitive price 
and the actual share price, multiplied by the transaction-specific number 
of common shares. Importantly, our methodology used the PE firms’ own 
valuation documents, LBO models, and inputs. The actual price was the 
LBO’s offer share price. Based on this analysis, we conclude that there is 
a reliable and common methodology using common evidence that could 
be applied to ascertain whether the PE firms’ conduct resulted in antitrust 
impact and damages to proposed class members. 
Damages Using the CAPM to Estimate But-For Competitive IRRs 
Tables 1 to 8 show the results of the Plaintiffs’ antitrust damages for 
the eight transactions, using the transaction-specific but-for competitive 
 
 86. Supra note 66. 
 87. See supra note 66, at 1869, table 1.  
 88. See, e.g., Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23 REV. 
OF FIN. STUD. 2303 (2010). 
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IRRs estimated using the CAPM methodology. For example, Table 1 
shows PE firms’ equity valuations per share for AMC, as well as the PE 
firms’ equity valuations per share multiplied by 𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛, the 
transaction-specific number of common shares. As shown in Table 1, the 
competitive price, i.e., the second highest equity value per share, exceeds 
the actual price and therefore, we conclude that the proposed class 
members incurred damages in the AMC transaction. 
Tables 1 to 8 show that for all eight transactions, the competitive price 
exceeds the actual price. The results show that proposed class members 
incurred damages in each of the eight transactions. Since damages for the 
eight transactions are positive, we conclude that there was an antitrust 
impact from the alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. As 
shown in Table 9, total damages across all eight transactions equal 
approximately $11.97 billion.  
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Table 1 





per Share ($)/1 
Equity Valuation per Share 
Multiplied by NCommon ($mil) 
Apollo 22.52 834.8 








Actual Price 19.50 722.9 
Antitrust 
Damages/3 
  55.6 
Notes: 
/1 PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%.  The IRR was 
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV.  The market 
rate of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 
index for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 
2004 (i.e., the month before the deal announcement date).  The risk-free rate is the 10-year 
treasury constant maturity rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which 
the 10-year treasury constant maturity rate was reported.  The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated 
using CRSP data for the five-year period up to six months prior to the announcement of the 
transaction. 
/2 For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the 
second highest equity valuation. 
/3 Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual 
price per share, multiplied by 𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛. 
 
Source:  
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. 
filed Aug. 1, 2014), at 6. 
37
Burke et al.: Masters of the Universe: Bid Rigging by Private Equity Firms in M
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
66 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
Table 2 




per Share ($)/1 
Equity Valuation per Share 
Multiplied by NCommon ($mil) 




J.P. Morgan 36.10 6,506.4 
KKR 35.45 6,388.4 












/1 PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%.  The IRR was 
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV.  The market rate 
of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index for the 
period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e., the month 
before the deal announcement date).  The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant maturity rate 
on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury constant 
maturity rate was reported.  The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the five-year 
period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
/2 For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second 
highest equity valuation. 
/3 Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price per 
share, multiplied by 𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛. 
 
Source: 
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed Aug. 
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Table 3 
Freescale Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 19.57% 
PE Firm 
Equity Valuation 
per Share ($)/1 
Equity Valuation per Share 
Multiplied by NCommon ($mil) 
AIG 37.10 15,336.8 
Blackstone 40.00 16,534.9 








Actual Price 40.00 16,534.9 
Antitrust 
Damages/3 
  413.4 
Notes: 
/1 PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%.  The IRR was 
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV.  The market 
rate of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index 
for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e., 
the month before the deal announcement date).  The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant 
maturity rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury 
constant maturity rate was reported.  The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the 
five-year period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
/2 For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second 
highest equity valuation. 
/3 Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price 
per share, multiplied by 𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛. 
 
Source:  
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed 
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Table 4 
Harrah’s Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 17.02% 
PE Firm 
Equity Valuation 
per Share ($)/1 
Equity Valuation per Share 
Multiplied by NCommon ($mil) 








Actual Price 90.00 16,699.3 
Antitrust 
Damages/3 
  701.4 
Notes: 
/1 PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%.  The IRR was 
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV.  The market 
rate of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index 
for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e., 
the month before the deal announcement date).  The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant 
maturity rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury 
constant maturity rate was reported.  The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the 
five-year period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
/2 For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second 
highest equity valuation. 
/3 Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price 
per share, multiplied by 𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛. 
 
Source:  
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed 
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Table 5 
HCA Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 13.71% 
PE Firm 
Equity Valuation 
per Share ($)/1 
Equity Valuation per Share 
Multiplied by NCommon ($mil) 
Bain 52.01 21,300.6 
Blackstone 60.14 24,630.2 




KKR 50.70 20,762.0 




Actual Price 51.00 20,886.9 
Antitrust 
Damages/3 
  3,743.3 
Notes: 
/1 PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%.  The IRR was 
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV.  The market 
rate of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index 
for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e., 
the month before the deal announcement date).  The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant 
maturity rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury 
constant maturity rate was reported.  The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the 
five-year period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
/2 For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second 
highest equity valuation. 
/3 Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price 
per share, multiplied by 𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛. 
 
Source:  
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed 
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Table 6 
Kinder Morgan Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 14.38% 
PE Firm 
Equity Valuation 
per Share ($)/1 
Equity Valuation per Share 
Multiplied by NCommon ($mil) 
Apollo 100.92 13,522.3 
Blackstone 100.35 13,446.0 
Carlyle 137.80 18,463.9 
Goldman Sachs 149.55 20,038.3 
KKR 138.30 18,530.9 
J.P. Morgan 157.15 21,056.7 




Actual Price 107.50 14,404.0 
Antitrust 
Damages/3 
  5,634.3 
Notes: 
/1 PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%.  The IRR was 
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV.  The market rate 
of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index for the 
period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e., the month 
before the deal announcement date).  The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant maturity 
rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury constant 
maturity rate was reported.  The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the five-year 
period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
/2 For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second 
highest equity valuation. 
/3 Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price 
per share, multiplied by 𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛. 
 
Source:  
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed 
Aug. 1, 2014), at 11. 
   
  
42
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss1/2
2018] BID RIGGING BY PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS 71 
Table 7 
Sungard Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 17.14% 
PE Firm 
Equity Valuation 
per Share ($)/1 
Equity Valuation per Share 
Multiplied by NCommon ($mil) 
Bain 38.02 11,038.7 
Blackstone 35.48 10,301.7 
Carlyle 36.35 10,553.6 
KKR 35.23 10,227.2 
Silver Lake 38.78 11,259.4 
T.H. Lee 33.59 9,751.6 




Actual Price 36.00 10,452.2 
Antitrust 
Damages/3 
  586.5 
Notes: 
/1 PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%.  The IRR was 
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV.  The market rate 
of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index for the 
period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e., the month 
before the deal announcement date).  The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant maturity 
rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury constant 
maturity rate was reported.  The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the five-year 
period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
/2 For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second 
highest equity valuation. 
/3 Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price 
per share, multiplied by 𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛. 
 
Source:  
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed 
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Table 8 
TXU Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 15.68% 
PE Firm 
Equity Valuation 
per Share ($)/1 
Equity Valuation per Share 
Multiplied by NCommon ($mil) 
Apollo/2 75.00 34,589.7 
Blackstone 66.12 30,494.3 
Goldman Sachs 68.00 31,361.4 
J.P. Morgan 70.18 32,366.8 
KKR 67.20 30,993.1 




Actual Price 69.25 31,937.9 
Antitrust 
Damages/4 
  428.9 
Notes: 
/1 PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.68%.  The IRR was 
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV.  The market 
rate of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index 
for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to January 2007 
(i.e., the month before the deal announcement date).  The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury 
constant maturity rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year 
treasury constant maturity rate was reported.  The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data 
for the five-year period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
/2 For Apollo, the equity valuation per share was obtained from APOLLO106617.pdf, which 
reports an offer price per share of $75.00 for an IRR of 17.6%, but does not report offer prices per 
share for IRRs lower than 17.6%.  Since the offer price per share increases as the IRR decreases, 
using the offer price per share at the higher IRR of 17.6% is conservative. 
/3 For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second 
highest equity valuation. 
/4 Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price 
per share, multiplied by 𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛. 
 
Sources:  
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed 
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Table 9 








AMC 778.5 722.9 55.6 
Aramark 6,497.4 6,091.9 405.5 
Freescale 16,948.2 16,534.9 413.4 
Harrah’s 17,400.7 16,699.3 701.4 
HCA 24,630.2 20,886.9 3,743.3 
Kinder 
Morgan 20,038.3 14,404.0 5,634.3 
SunGard 11,038.7 10,452.2 586.5 
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APPENDIX III: EQUITY VALUATION METHODOLOGY 
A PE firm’s equity valuation per share for a transaction is the 
maximum price per share the firm is willing to pay, given its target IRR. 
For each transaction, we first select each PE firm’s most recent internal 
LBO analysis document that contains sufficient data and information to 
estimate the equity valuation per share using the methodology described 
in this appendix. Furthermore, in the case of winning PE firms, we only 
consider documents reporting LBO analysis conducted prior to the LBO 
announcement date. PE firms’ internal LBO analysis documents report 
predicted IRRs for given share prices and assumptions on future target 
firm cash flows and exit values. In all other instances, we obtain data from 
the PE firms’ LBO analysis documents to estimate equity valuations per 
share. Thus, for each transaction, our methodology to estimate a PE firm’s 
equity valuation per share uses the PE firms’ own LBO analysis 
methodology. 
The selected document is either an Excel spreadsheet or is in PDF 
format. When the selected document is an Excel spreadsheet, we estimate 
the PE firm’s equity valuation per share by determining the share price at 
which the PE firm’s predicted IRR equals the competitive IRR. 
When the selected document is in PDF format, we use one of the 
following three methodologies depending on transaction-specific factors 
and the particular plans of the PE firm: 
Methodology I: Using PE Firm’s Exit EV/EBITDA Multiple 
Under this methodology, no dividends are paid before the exit year and 
the exit year total enterprise value (𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑇) is calculated as the product of 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑇 and exit EV/EBITDA multiple (𝜒). For a given target IRR 
level (𝑟), we estimate the equity valuation per share using the following 
steps: 
Step 1: Estimating equity investment (𝐸0)  
The terminal equity value, 𝐸𝑇, is given by 
 
𝐸𝑇 = 𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑇 + 𝐶𝑇 − 𝐷𝑇             (1) 
 
where 𝐶𝑇 and 𝐷𝑇 denote cash on hand and total debt at the exit year. Cash 
payment to new sponsors, 𝐼𝑇, i: 
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where 𝜔𝑇, 𝑂𝑃𝑇, 𝛼, and 𝐸0 denote the sponsor’s ownership percentage at 
the exit time, management option proceeds at the exit time, percent of 
equity that are management options, and total equity investment at the 
LBO time.89 
 
New sponsor’s equity investment, 𝐼0, can be calculated using the 
definition of IRR as follows:90 
 
𝐼0 = 𝜔0𝐸0 = 𝐼𝑇(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑇             (3) 
 
where 𝜔0 denotes the sponsor’s ownership percentage at the LBO time. 
 






          (4) 
Step 2: Estimating the total purchase price (𝑇𝑃𝑃0) 
𝑇𝑃𝑃0  = 𝐸0 + 𝐷0 − 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠                 (5) 
  
where 𝐷0 denotes the debt financing level, and 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 denotes total LBO 
financing and transaction fees. 
Step 3: Estimating the equity valuation per share 
Using the fact that total sources equal total uses in an LBO, we have 
 
𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑒  = 𝑇𝑃𝑃0 + 𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝐷𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝐶0                 (6) 
 
where 𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑒 denotes total equity value paid to the shareholders, 𝐷𝑝𝑟𝑒 
denotes the debt level before the LBO, 𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑒 denotes the cash level before 
the LBO, and 𝐶0 denotes cash on hand after the LBO.  
 
The equity value per share, 𝑃, is calculated as follows: 
 
 
 89. Option proceeds are fixed at the reported value if there is insufficient information to determine 
the formula used to calculate it. Note that α equals 1-ω_T when ω_0 equals 1. 
 90.  One PE firm’s LBO analysis of Aramark suggests that the formula 𝐼0 − 𝑆𝐷𝐹 =
𝐼𝑇(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑇 is used to estimate the IRR, where 𝑆𝐷𝐹 denotes Sponsor Deal Fees.  
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          (7) 
where 𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the number of total diluted shares outstanding. 
Methodology II: Using PE Firm’s Exit P/E Multiple 
Under this methodology, no dividends are paid before the exit year and 
the exit year total equity value (𝐸𝑇) is calculated as the product of net 
income (NIT) and exit P/E multiple (𝜙): 
 
𝐸𝑇 = 𝜙 × 𝑁𝐼𝑇                 (8) 
 Once 𝐸𝑇 is calculated using equation (8), the PE firm’s equity valuation 
per share is estimated using equations (2) to (7). 
Methodology III: Using PE Firm’s Segment Exit Multiples 
Some documents do not report a company-wide exit multiple. Instead, 
each segment of the company has its own EBITDA and exit multiple. In 
this case, we first use the exit multiple to calculate the total enterprise 
value for each segment. Then, we sum the total enterprise values across 
the segments to obtain the company-wide total enterprise value, 𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑇. 
The exit equity valuation is then calculated as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑇 = 𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑇 + 𝐶𝑇 − 𝐷𝑇                   (9) 
 Once 𝐸𝑇 is calculated using equation (9), the PE firm’s equity valuation 
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